DELAWARE’S NEW PROXY ACCESS: MUCH ADO ABOUT
NOTHING?
LISA M. FAIRFAX∗
Over the past few years, there have been considerable changes at the federal
and state levels with respect to shareholders’ voting rights, and those changes could
have a profound impact on director elections and corporate governance.1 These
changes include a significant increase in the number of public companies that have
embraced a majority voting regime for director elections in lieu of a plurality voting
standard,2 a shift away from classified boards and towards annual director elections,3
and the implementation of “e-proxy” rules enabling shareholders in public
corporations to submit their proxies electronically.4 These changes also have spurred
much debate about the relative benefits and drawbacks of increasing shareholder
power, particularly in the context of director elections.5 While opponents contend
that such increased power may harm the long-term interests of the corporation and
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1

See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259 (2009) (discussing some
of those changes).
2

See id. at 1288-92 (“[S]ixty-six percent of S&P 500 companies and fifty-seven percent of Fortune 500
companies had adopted a form of majority voting” by the end of 2007) (citing Claudia H. Allen, Study
of Majority Voting in Director Elections, Nov. 12, 2007, at 1, http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/
majoritystudy111207.pdf).

3

See Fairfax, supra note 1, at 1303-04. According to one study, at the end of fiscal year 2007, 73 of the
top 100 companies had a declassified board. See Shearman & Sterling LLP, 2008 Trends in Corporate
Governance of the Largest U.S. Public Companies: General Governance Practices 30-31 (2008), available at
http://www.shearman.com/corpgovsurvey. By June 2008, some 50 percent of S&P 500 companies
had adopted some form of majority voting. See RiskMetrics Group, 2008 Postseason Report Summary:
Weathering the Storm: Investors Respond to the Global Credit Crisis 3 (Oct. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.riskmetrics.com (search “2008 Postseason Report Summary”).
4

See Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 4148, 4148-49 (Jan. 29, 2007) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, and 274); Fairfax, supra note 1, at 1279-80.

5 See e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response to Increasing Shareholder Power: Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1745-46 (2006) (offering an “explanation for why limited
shareholder voting rights is corporate law’s majoritarian default.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for
Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 624 (2006) (pinpointing an increase in
shareholder power, and identifying reasons why such an increase is inappropriate); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 851 (2005) (discussing
shareholder power with regard to director elections).
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its shareholders,6 proponents contend that augmenting shareholder power could
increase shareholders’ ability to influence director elections, and, by extension, could
enhance shareholders’ ability to influence corporate affairs and reduce managerial
misconduct.7
Recently, Delaware, the incorporation home of a majority of public
companies,8 amended its general corporation code in a manner that appears to have
important implications not only for shareholders’ voting rights, but also for
Delaware’s role in the corporate governance landscape.9 Delaware enacted a
provision related to shareholders’ ability to access the corporation’s proxy statement
for the purpose of nominating director candidates of their choice, often referred to
as “proxy access,” as well as a provision related to reimbursement of shareholders’
proxy expenses.10 Both provisions appear to have significant implications for
shareholders. Indeed, shareholders have long viewed access to the corporation’s
6

See Bainbridge, Response to Increasing Shareholder Power: Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,
supra note 5, at 1752-54.
7

See Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 856-57.

8

According to the website for Delaware’s Division of Corporations, “[m]ore than [half a million]
business entities have their legal home in Delaware including more than 50% of all U.S. publiclytraded companies and 63% of the Fortune 500.” See Delaware Division of Corporations, Why
Choose Delaware as Your Corporate Home?, http://corp.delaware.gov (last visited Aug. 24, 2009).

9

On April 10, 2009, Delaware signed into law several changes to its corporate code. See An Act to
Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to the General Corporation Law, H.R. 19, 145th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009), [hereinafter Delaware Amendments] (providing a complete list of the
changes). In June 2009, the Corporate Laws Committee of the American Bar Association (“ABA”)
proposed amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”) related to proxy access and
proxy expense reimbursement. See News Release, American Bar Association, Corporate Laws
Committee Takes Steps to Provide for Shareholder Access to the Nomination Process (June 29,
2009), http://www.abanet.org (search “Corporate Laws Committee”; then follow hyperlink). The
amendments favor private ordering and hence provide a vehicle for directors or shareholders to
establish their own procedures to allow for proxy access and reimbursement of expenses. Id. Because
over 30 state corporate codes are based on the MBCA, such amendments, if enacted, could usher in
major changes for most states. In addition to these recent changes, North Dakota’s corporate code
specifically allows proxy access for shareholders owning more than five percent of the outstanding
shares of a public company for at least two years and enables shareholders to be reimbursed for
certain proxy-related expenses. See North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporation Act, N.D. CENT.
CODE § 10-35-02, -08, -10 (2007). While this essay acknowledges the importance of these and other
changes at the state level, it focuses on Delaware’s actions, particularly in light of Delaware’s
prominence in the corporate law arena.
10

Delaware enacted new Section 112 granting companies the option to adopt bylaw provisions
permitting shareholders access to a company’s proxy statement in order to nominate director
candidates, subject to certain conditions. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (Supp. 2009). Delaware
also provided for a new Section 113, which permits companies to adopt bylaw provisions to
reimburse shareholders for expenses incurred in connection with proxy solicitations for director
elections. See id. at § 113; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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proxy statement as pivotal to effectuating their rights within the corporation and
ensuring managerial accountability.11
Then too, some consider expense
reimbursement bylaws to represent a form of proxy access because they allow
shareholders to nominate directors without incurring costs associated with preparing
and distributing a proxy statement.12 By paving the way for greater access to the
proxy statement, Delaware’s recent legislative changes appear to have a vital impact
on shareholders’ ability to participate in elections and influence corporate conduct.
Beyond this impact on shareholder rights, many speculate that Delaware
adopted such changes in order to “maintain its importance as the pre-eminent state”
for corporate law and thus to head off federal regulation in this area.13 In the wake
of the recent financial meltdown and economic recession, the federal government
has adopted several corporate governance initiatives that impact areas traditionally
the province of state regulation.14 Then too, the Securities and Exchange
Commission ( “SEC”) once again has proposed a rule that would grant proxy access
to shareholders of all public companies.15 The current economic crisis has generated
considerable momentum for adoption of such a proposal or some other provision
that reforms the current proxy regime.16 These federal initiatives impinge on
11

Upon proposing its proxy access rules, the SEC noted: “[r]efining the proxy process so that it
replicates, as nearly as possible, the annual meeting is particularly important given that the proxy
process has become the primary way for shareholders to know about the matters to be decided by the
shareholders and to make their views known to company management.” See Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Votes to Propose Rule Amendments to Facilitate Rights of Shareholders to
Nominate Directors (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-116.htm
[hereinafter SEC Statement on 2009 Proxy Access Proposal].

12 See Posting of Charles Nathan to The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and
Financial Regulation, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/07/07/delaware-law-changes-tofacilitate-voluntary-adoption-of-proxy-access (July 7, 2009, 9:27 EST).
13

See id.

14

This includes initiatives related to executive compensation, as well as those requiring that certain
corporations enable their shareholders to cast an advisory vote on executive compensation. See
generally American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009)
(providing for “say-on-pay” votes and other corporate governance guidelines); Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (imposing corporate governance and
executive compensation guidelines for companies receiving federal funds); U.S. Treasury Dep’t,
Interim Final Rule: TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg.
28,394 (June 15, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30) (Treasury Department Rules on executive
compensation).

15 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (June 18, 2009) (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 274) [hereinafter 2009 Proxy Access Proposal].
16

In its overview of the 2009 Proxy Access Proposal, the SEC noted:
The nation and the markets have recently experienced, and remain in the midst of,
one of the most serious economic crises of the past century. This crisis has led
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corporate governance matters traditionally regulated by state law.17 As a result, given
that Delaware traditionally has played a prominent, if not dominant, role in shaping
corporate law, these federal initiatives appear to undercut Delaware’s dominance and
authority in this area.18 Hence, some speculate that Delaware took these actions not
only to confirm or otherwise reassert its role as leader in the corporate governance
arena, but also to prevent or curtail further federal encroachment into this area, since
such encroachment necessarily undercuts that role.19 The observation that the most
significant threat to Delaware’s corporate governance authority likely stems from the
federal government is not a novel one.20 In this regard, Delaware’s attempt to
many to raise serious concerns about the accounatibility and responsiveness of
some companies and boards of directors to the interests of shareholders, and has
resulted in a loss of investor confidence. These concerns have included questions
about whether boards are exercising appropriate oversight of management, whether
boards are appropriately focused on shareholder interests, and whether boards
need to be more accountable for their decisions regarding such issues as
compensation structures and risk management. In light of the current economic
crisis and these continuing concerns, the Commission has determined to revisit
whether and how the federal proxy rules may be impeding the ability of
shareholders to hold boards accountable through the exercise of their fundamental
right [under state law] to nominate and elect members to company boards of
directors.
Id. at 29,025.
17

To be sure, states traditionally regulate corporate governance matters as well as matters involving
the voting rights of shareholders. See, e.g., 2009 Proxy Access Proposal, supra note 15, at 29,025; CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (“No principle of corporation law and
practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations, including
the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders.”). However, regulation of the proxy
proposal and proxy disclosure process is a “core” federal function and one in which the SEC has long
been engaged. See 2009 Proxy Access Proposal, supra note 15, at 29,025. See Alan R. Palmiter, Securities
Regulation: The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 886
(1994); Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129,
1135 (1993). Hence, it is likely more accurate to refer to regulation in this area as one of shareholder
responsibilities.
18

See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Litigation Reform Since the PSLRA: A Ten-Year Retrospective: Panel Three:
Sarbanes-Oxley Governance Issues: The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1749, 1749 (2006) (noting that “Delaware occupies an outsized place in the formation of business
entities.”); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L.
625, 625 (2004); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1210 (2001); Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J.
CORP. L. 99, 99 (2005); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 601 (2003) (noting
the “totality” of Delaware’s influence on corporate law).
19
20

See Charles Nathan, supra note 12.

See Roe, supra note 18, at 600 (titling an entire section “Delaware’s Main Competitor in Making
Corporate Law: Washington, D.C.”); McDonnell, supra note 18, at 101 (noting “the threat of federal
intervention limits what Delaware can do.”).
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undermine that threat is not surprising. Delaware’s recent actions thus may be
viewed as having the twin goals of buttressing shareholders’ voting rights and
reaffirming Delaware’s position in the corporate governance lexicon.
This essay examines whether such actions have been or can be successful in
achieving either of these two goals. Critical examination of the new legislation’s
impact suggests that, while the new Delaware amendments may do very little in the
way of directly advancing shareholder rights, they may play an indirect role in such
advancement, and that role could prove significant in enhancing shareholder access
to the proxy. Moreover, Delaware may be successful in forestalling federal
intervention in this area, a result that may prove unsatisfactory for many shareholder
advocates.
Part I of this Essay not only details the new Delaware legislation, but also
highlights recent federal actions related to proxy access and shareholder rights. Part
II explores the impact of the Delaware legislation on enhancing shareholder rights
with respect to proxy access, while Part III examines whether and to what extent
Delaware’s actions served or can serve as a catalyst for curtailing increased federal
intrusion into this sphere. Part IV offers some conclusions.
I.

PROXY ACCESS AND SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS

Shareholder advocates have long viewed access to the corporation’s proxy
statement as the “holy grail” of shareholder rights because, in providing them a
channel for nominating candidates of their choice, such access enables shareholders
a more robust role in director elections, thus increasing the likelihood that
shareholders can impact election outcomes and board governance.21 Indeed, because
shareholders in public corporations vote by proxy, the proxy statement, which
identifies the candidates for whom shareholders may cast a vote, is the primary
vehicle through which shareholders can nominate and thereafter vote on director
candidates of their choice.22 This means that shareholders either must prepare and
distribute their own proxy statement or be granted access to the proxy statement
distributed by the corporation. The expense associated with preparing and
distributing a proxy statement makes such an action prohibitive for most
shareholders.23 Granting shareholders access to the corporate proxy statement

21

See Karey Wutkowski, SEC to Look Outside Ballot on Proxy Access, REUTERS, Jan. 4, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com (search “SEC to Look Outside”).

22

See Fairfax, supra note 1, at 1263-64.

23 See id. at 1265; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,
682-83 (2007).
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eliminates this expense,24 and thus represents one of the few ways in which most
shareholders can have a role in the director nomination process.25 Without such
access, most director elections feature candidates nominated solely by corporate
managers and directors.26
There is debate about the importance and efficacy of proxy access. Indeed,
there are other avenues for shareholders to impact director conduct,27 as well as
other, albeit expensive, means for shareholders to put forward candidates of their
choice.28 Also, it is not clear that proxy access can alter managerial behavior or
otherwise prevent managerial misconduct, particularly the misconduct that triggered
the current financial crisis and recession. In this respect, proxy access is not a
panacea. Furthermore, granting all shareholders access to the proxy statement could
increase the influence of shareholders with narrow or special interests in a manner
that could have negative repercussions for corporations and shareholders as a
24

To be sure, proxy access does not eliminate the cost entirely, but instead shifts that cost so that it is
borne by the corporation. While some view this shift as problematic, it also may be viewed as more
equitable because it ensures that the corporation covers the proxy expense of both managerial and
shareholder candidates, rather than only supporting the campaigns of management-supported
nominees. See Comment Letter from American Bar Association, Business Law Section, Committee
on the Federal Regulation of Securities to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 5 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-456.pdf [hereinafter Federal Securities Regulation
Comment Letter] (expressing the view that proxy access and shifting costs to the corporation are
problematic).
25

Some shareholders do run their own proxy contests, and while the costs of proxy distribution have
made the number of such contests relatively small, such contests have increased over the last few
years, though the relative number still appears to be low. See Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 856 (noting the
considerable expense of proxy distribution to shareholders); RiskMetrics Group, 2008 U.S. Proxy
Postseason Review 28 (updated Oct. 10, 2008) (pinpointing a 57-percent increase in the number of
proxy contests from 2007 to 2008, which amounts to 40 in 2008, compared to 30 in the previous
year). Shareholders also may recommend candidates to the board’s nominating committee, though
apparently boards rarely respond to such recommendations. See Security Holder Director
Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786 (Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249,
274) (indicating that shareholder recommendations to nominating committees rarely have any effect).
26

According to some, this system essentially transforming the director election process is a pro-forma
exercise. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489,
1503-04 (1970).

27

See Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 851 (“[T]he power to replace directors is sufficient to ensure that
value-enhancing changes in governance arrangements will occur . . . although actual replacement of
incumbent directors does not occur frequently . . ..”). Shareholders may also bring a derivative action,
and some evidence suggests that “withhold-the-vote” or “just-say-no” campaigns influence board
behavior. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Internal Contradictions in the SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules 13-14
(Rook Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stan. Univ., Working Paper No. 60, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1438308.
28

See Fairfax, supra note 1, at 1265.
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whole.29 Nevertheless, advocates of proxy access as well as the SEC contend that
such access gives shareholders the ability to participate more fully in the nomination
and director process, thereby protecting their fundamental voting right.30 Advocates
further maintain that “the presence of shareholder-nominated directors would make
boards more accountable to the shareholders who own the company and that this
accountability would improve corporate governance and make companies more
responsive to shareholder concerns.”31 By contrast, the lack of proxy access reduces
the extent to which the director election process ensures that directors are
accountable to shareholders. Hence, proponents of a proxy access rule insist that
such a rule could have a significant impact on public corporations and their boards;
thus, such proponents have long lobbied for access to the corporation’s proxy
statement.32 In 2009, their efforts culminated in reaction from Delaware and the
federal government.
A.

Delaware and Proxy Access

In April 2009, the Delaware governor signed into law several provisions
related to shareholder voting, which took effect on August 1, 2009.33 New section
112 of the Delaware Code, entitled “Access to Proxy Solicitation Materials,” gives
companies the option to adopt bylaw provisions that grant shareholders access to the
29 See Bainbridge, Response to Increasing Shareholder Power: Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,
supra note 5, at 1754; Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 811-12 (1993); see also Federal Securities Regulation Comment Letter, supra note 24,
at 5 (noting that a federal proxy access rule, as proposed by the SEC, among other things could (i)
“encourage proxy contests, creating costs, burdens and distractions for the companies and their
shareholders,” (ii) “discourage qualified directors from serving,” and (iii) “increase the costs borne by
corporations.”).
30 See 2009 Proxy Access Proposal, supra note 15, at 29,025-26. In fact, one survey found that some 82
percent of American investors agreed that shareholders should have the ability to nominate and elect
directors of their choice. See Comment Letter from Shareowners Educ. Net. Bd. of Dirs. to U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009496.pdf.
31

See 2009 Proxy Access Proposal, supra note 15, at 29,026, n.34 (citing comment letters).

32

See Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 851.

33

See Delaware Amendments, supra note 9. In addition to proxy access and expense reimbursement, the
new Delaware amendments provide that a right to indemnification or advancement of expenses
cannot be altered or eliminated after the occurrence of the act or omission for which such
indemnification or expense relates, unless such alteration or elimination was already explicitly
authorized. See id.; contra Schoon v. Troy Corp., 948 A.2d 1157 (Del. Ch. 2008) (demonstrating how a
case was decided prior to the 2009 amendment). The amendments also implement various changes
allowing for a separate record and notice date for stockholder meetings, and allow the corporation, as
well as the shareholders in a derivative suit, to seek removal of directors under special circumstances
by application to the Chancery Court. See Delaware Amendments, supra note 9.
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corporate proxy statement in order to nominate directorial candidates of their
choice.34 In particular, that section states:
The bylaws may provide that if the corporation solicits proxies with
respect to an election of directors, it may be required, to the extent
and subject to such procedures or conditions as may be provided in
the bylaws, to include in its proxy solicitation materials (including any
form of proxy it distributes), in addition to individuals nominated by
the board of directors, one or more individuals nominated by a
stockholder.35
Section 112 then pinpoints the various procedures or conditions that
companies may consider imposing:
(1) A provision requiring a minimum record or beneficial ownership,
or duration of ownership, of shares of the corporation’s capital stock,
by the nominating stockholder, and defining beneficial ownership to
take into account options or other rights in respect of or related to
such stock;
(2) A provision requiring the nominating stockholder to submit
specified information concerning the stockholder and the
stockholder’s nominees, including information concerning ownership
by such persons of shares of the corporation’s capital stock, or
options or other rights in respect of or related to such stock;
(3) A provision conditioning eligibility to require inclusion in the
corporation’s proxy solicitation materials upon the number or
proportion of directors nominated by stockholders or whether the
stockholder previously sought to require such inclusion;
(4) A provision precluding nominations by any person if such person,
any nominee of such person, or any affiliate or associate of such
person or nominee, has acquired or publicly proposed to acquire
shares constituting a specified percentage of the voting power of the
corporation’s outstanding voting stock within a specified period
before the election of directors;
(5) A provision requiring that the nominating stockholder undertake
to indemnify the corporation in respect of any loss arising as a result
of any false or misleading information or statement submitted by the
nominating stockholder in connection with a nomination; and
34

Delaware Amendments, supra note 9.

35

Id.
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(6) Any other lawful condition.36
New section 113 of the Delaware Code, entitled “Proxy Expense
Reimbursement,” states that a corporation’s bylaws “may provide for the
reimbursement by the corporation of expenses incurred by a stockholder in soliciting
proxies in connection with an election of directors, subject to such procedures or
conditions as the bylaws may prescribe.”37 Like section 112, section 113 pinpoints a
list of non-exclusive procedures and conditions that corporations may adopt when
implementing an expense reimbursement bylaw:
(1) Conditioning eligibility for reimbursement upon the number or
proportion of persons nominated by the stockholder seeking
reimbursement or whether such stockholder previously sought
reimbursement for similar expenses;
(2) Limitations on the amount of reimbursement based upon the
proportion of votes cast in favor of one or more of the persons
nominated by the stockholder seeking reimbursement, or upon the
amount spent by the corporation in soliciting proxies in connection
with the election;
(3) Limitations concerning elections of directors by cumulative voting
. . .; or
(4) Any other lawful condition.38
Both sections 112 and 113 rely on private ordering. Hence, both sections
not only grant corporations the option of adopting bylaws to allow for proxy access
or reimbursement of proxy expenses, but also give corporations the discretion to
determine how such bylaws will be crafted.39
B.

The Federal Response

On June 10, 2009, for the fifth time in its history, the SEC proposed a rule
that would grant shareholders access to the corporation’s proxy statement to
nominate directorial candidates of their choice.40 Under the new Rule 14a-11 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”),41 shareholders
36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

See id.

40

2009 Proxy Access Proposal, supra note 15; see Fairfax, supra note 1, at 1273-77 (explaining previous
efforts to implement proxy access).

41

See 2009 Proxy Access Proposal, supra note 15, at 29,031.

96

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 11

would be eligible to have their nominee included on the corporation’s proxy
materials if they (1) own a certain percentage of the corporation’s securities;42 (2)
have held the securities for at least one year and intend to do so through the annual
meeting; and (3) are not holding the shares in order to change control of the
company or gain more than minority representation on the board.43 New Rule 14a11 also provides that shareholders only would be able to nominate one candidate or
the number of candidates that would represent up to 25 percent of the company’s
board, whichever is greater.44
Unlike the Delaware law, the federal law would require public corporations to
provide proxy access as long as certain conditions were met.45 As currently drafted,
the federal proxy access rule does not enable corporations to opt out of such access,
even if shareholders desire such an option.46 In this regard, the federal law can be
viewed as mandating proxy access. While some commentators maintain that the
proposed rule represents an “appropriate compromise in establishing minimum
disclosure requirements,”47 others argue that a federally-mandated proxy access rule
poses “[i]ssues of [w]orkability, [c]omplexity, and [f]lexibility.”48
In addition to its proxy access proposal, the SEC has proposed to amend
Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to require companies to include on their proxy
statements shareholder proposals regarding the company’s nomination procedures as
long as they do not conflict with new Rule 14a-11.49 Currently, federal law requires
corporations to include bylaw amendments and other proposals from shareholders in

42

Id. at 29,035. Shareholders would be eligible to have their nominee included in the proxy materials
if they: (a) own at least one percent of the voting securities of a “large accelerated filer” (a company
with a worldwide market value of $700 million or more) or of a registered investment company with
net assets of $700 million or more;(b) own at least three percent of the voting securities of an
“accelerated filer” (a company with a worldwide market value of $75 million or more but less than
$700 million) or of a registered investment company with net assets of $75 million or more but less
than $700 million; or(c) own at least five percent of the voting securities of a “non-accelerated filer” (a
company with a worldwide market value of less than $75 million) or of a registered investment
company with net assets of less than $75 million. Id.

43

Id.

44

See id. at 29,084.

45

See id. at 29,024.

46

See generally id. (providing shareholders with proxy access as long as certain requirements are met).

47

See Comment Letter from Nine Securities and Governance Law Firms to U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n 4 (Aug. 25, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-508.pdf
[hereinafter Comment Letter of Securities and Governance Firms].
48

See, e.g., Federal Securities Regulation Comment Letter, supra note 24, at 9-14.

49

See 2009 Proxy Access Proposal, supra note 15, at 29,056.
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their proxy statement, subject to certain exclusions.50 One such exclusion is the socalled “election exclusion” contained in Rule 14a-8(i)(8), which enables corporations
to exclude shareholder proposals that relate to a nomination or an election for
membership on a corporation’s board.51 In 2007, the SEC amended Rule 14a-8(i)(8)
to allow exclusion of proposals related to election procedures, as well as those
relating to actual elections or nominations.52 The amendment was aimed at
preventing shareholders from using the shareholder proposal process to propose
proxy access bylaws that would establish procedures requiring corporations to grant
shareholders access to a company’s proxy statement in future elections.53 Hence, the
current SEC proposal reverses the SEC’s course, essentially repealing the provision
adopted by the SEC two years ago.54 As a result, new Rule 14a-8 would enable
shareholders to propose bylaws containing procedures for instituting proxy access,
thereby enabling such procedures to be submitted for shareholder vote.
While new Rule 14a-11 would require all public corporations to adopt some
form of proxy access,55 new Rule 14a-8(i)(8) reflects a relatively more modest
proposal because it permits shareholders to propose proxy access bylaws that can be
approved or defeated by shareholders.56 In that regard, new Rule 14a-8(i)(8) reflects
a form of private ordering similar to the Delaware approach. Interestingly, many
commentators who opposed the adoption of Rule 14a-11 supported Rule 14a-8(i)(8),
noting that it “strikes the proper balance between permitting shareholders access to
issuers’ proxy materials without the intrusion and problems raised by the proposed
Rule 14a-11.”57
Supporters of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) include many prominent
50

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2009).

51

See id. at § 240.14a-8(i)(8).

52

See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450, 70,453-54
(Dec. 6, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 240).
53

See id.

54

See 2009 Proxy Access Proposal, supra note 15, at 29,056.

55

See id. at 29,031-32.

56

See id. at 29,056.

57 See Comment Letter from Arden Phillips, Chair, Association of Corporate Counsel: Corporate and
Securities Committee to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-337.pdf [hereinafter Comment Letter of ACC]; see also
Federal Securities Regulation Comment Letter, supra note 24, at 39 (noting support of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) as
long as certain revisions are made); Comment Letter from W. Derrick Britt and Samuel C. Dibble,
Co-Chairs, State Bar of California Business Law Section: Corporations Committee to U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, 7 (Aug. 18, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009495.pdf [hereinafter Comment Letter of California Bar Corporations Committee] (supporting the simple
proposed change to Rule 14a-8(i)(8)); Comment Letter from Edward J. Durkin, Director, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters: Corporate Affairs Department 1-2 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-492.pdf [hereinafter Comment Letter of UBC] (urging
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organizations, law firms, and individuals, including the Delaware State Bar
Association’s Council of the Corporation Law Section, the Corporate and Securities
Committee of the Association of Corporate Counsel, 26 corporate secretaries and
governance professionals, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, the Corporations
Committee of the Business Law Section of the California State Bar, and the
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the American Bar Association.58
Of course, both Rule 14a-11 and Rule 14a-8 are merely proposals. Thus,
there is no guarantee that the SEC will adopt them, or, if adopted, that they will
remain in their current form. Indeed, the SEC has sought comments on both
proposals, and while some comments express support for both rules, many others
identify flaws in their current formulation.59 Then too, the SEC has proposed proxy
access rules in the past, and none of those proposals have culminated in adoption of
a proxy access rule.60 Moreover, although the SEC had stated an intention to vote
on its proxy access rule in November 2009, on October 2, 2009, the SEC announced
that it would delay any decision on its new proxy access rule until 2010.61 To be sure,
not only has the new SEC Chair, Mary Schapiro, expressed a commitment to proxy
rejection of Rule 14a-11 and adoption of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to facilitate important debate); Comment
Letter from Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2
(Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-472.pdf [hereinafter
Comment Letter of Corporate Secretaries] (opining that Rule 14a-11 goes too far in curtailing shareholders’
state-law rights); Comment Letter from Seven Law Firms to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 6-7 (Aug. 17,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-212.pdf [hereinafter Comment
Letter of Seven Law Firms] (comments from Cravath, Davis Polk, Latham & Watkins, Skadden Arps,
Simpson Thatcher, Sullivan & Cromwell, and Wachtell Lipton) (stating that, in lieu of Rule 14a-11,
Rule 14a-8(i)(8) would provide needed flexibility); Comment Letter from James L. Holzman, Chair,
Delaware State Bar Association: Council of the Corporation Law Section to U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n 11 (July 24, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-65.pdf
[hereinafter Delaware State Bar Comment Letter] (expressing that, under Rule 14a-8(i)(8), stockholders’
proposal of proxy access bylaws would not be prohibitively expensive).
58

See Comment Letter of ACC, supra note 57; Federal Securities Regulation Comment Letter, supra note 24;
Comment Letter of California Bar Corporations Committee, supra note 57; Comment Letter of UBC, supra note
57; Comment Letter of Corporate Secretaries, supra note 57; Comment Letter of Seven Law Firms, supra note 57;
Delaware State Bar Comment Letter, supra note 57.

59

See Comment Letter of ACC, supra note 57; Federal Securities Regulation Comment Letter, supra note 24;
Comment Letter of California Bar Corporations Committee, supra note 57; Comment Letter of UBC, supra note
57; Comment Letter of Corporate Secretaries, supra note 57; Comment Letter of Seven Law Firms, supra note 57;
Delaware State Bar Comment Letter, supra note 57.

60
61

See Fairfax, supra note 1, at 1273-78.

See Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the 48th Annual Corporate
Counsel Institute: SEC Rulemaking – ‘Advancing the Law’ to Protect Investors (Oct. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch100209ebw.htm (noting that the SEC would
“likely move forward and consider an adopting release sometime in early 2010,” which would mean
that the final rules would likely not be in place at the beginning of the next proxy season).
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access, but the current economic environment appears to enhance the probability
that the SEC will be compelled to adopt some form of access law.62 This
commitment, coupled with the fact that even those who reject a prescriptive proxy
access rule indicate support for amended Rule 14a-8, increases the potential that the
SEC will adopt some form of proxy access rule.
Along with these proxy proposals, the SEC voted to eliminate broker
discretionary voting for both contested and uncontested director elections in July
2009.63 Under New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) Rule 452, brokers are
permitted to vote shares in their control for “‘routine’ matters”64 if brokers do not
receive voting instructions from the beneficial holders by the tenth day preceding a
shareholder meeting.65 The SEC voted to eliminate uncontested elections from
those matters classified as “routine,” and thus brokers cannot cast votes for
uninstructed shares in such elections.66
This rule, which likely impacts most public companies because it applies to
the actions of NYSE-registered brokers, could have a significant effect on
shareholders and their activist campaigns. In 2006, a NYSE working group noted
that brokers’ voting overwhelmingly follows the recommendation of incumbent
boards, thus influencing election outcomes, particularly in cases where there is an
organized “vote-no” or “withhold-the-vote” campaign.67 An example is Walt Disney
Company’s 2004 director election, the target of one of the most well-known
“withhold-the-vote” campaigns.68 If broker votes had not been counted, then CEO
and board chair Michael Eisner would have received only 45 percent of the votes in
favor of his reelection, while the majority of votes cast would have been withheld
from him.69 Instead, Eisner was reelected to the board with 55 percent of the votes
62

See Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to the Council of
Institutional Investors (Apr. 6, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/
spch040609mls.htm (noting that proxy access represents a critical response to the current crisis
because it is “about making boards more accountable for the risks undertaken by the companies they
manage”).
63 See Self-Regulatory Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,293, 33,305 (July 10, 2009) (order approving the
proposed changes to NYSE Rule 452).
64

See id. at 33,293 n.7.

65

See NYSE Rule 452 (2009).

66

See Self-Regulatory Organizations, supra note 63, at 33,304-05.

67 See Report and Recommendations of the Proxy Working Group to the New York Stock Exchange
13-14 (June 5, 2006) available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/PWG_REPORT.pdf.
68
69

Id. at 9.

See id. Of course, because directors at Disney only needed a plurality of the vote to be elected,
Eisner’s failure to receive a majority of the vote would not have impacted his ability to get reelected to
the board. See id. n.12.
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cast.70 This example shows that discretionary broker votes not only have a real
impact on election outcomes, but also have a real impact on withhold-the-vote
campaigns.71 The adoption of a majority voting standard by many public companies
makes this rule even more significant because it could make it more difficult for
directors to receive a majority vote, especially when those directors are targeted by
shareholders.72 In this respect, changes to NYSE Rule 452 could enhance
shareholders’ power related to campaigns that fall short of a full-blown proxy
contest.
In adopting changes to Rule 452, SEC Chair Schapiro noted that despite
logistical concerns as to the new rule’s implementation, the amended rule was based
on the recommendation of a diverse and sophisticated group convened by the
NYSE and had been awaiting SEC approval for nearly three years.73 As she stated,
“[k]eeping hard decisions on hold indefinitely does not solve problems.”74
As the foregoing discussion illuminates, both the federal government and
Delaware have responded to the call for increased shareholder voice in director
elections and corporate governance. According to the SEC, the economic crisis
underscored the need for proxy reform because it raised “serious concerns about the
accountability and responsiveness of some companies and boards of directors to the
interests of shareholders,” as well as concerns regarding how the proxy structure may
be “impeding the ability of shareholders to hold boards accountable.”75 Like the
federal government, Delaware’s actions reflect an attempt to respond to these
concerns. However, unlike the federal government, Delaware’s actions favor a
private ordering solution aimed at enabling corporations and shareholders to
structure their own proxy access regime. Delaware’s actions also reflect an effort to
ensure the state’s continued prominence in shaping the corporate governance
landscape. The next sections explore whether Delaware’s response facilitates the
achievement of these twin goals.

70

See id.

71

See id.

72 See id. at 13. The rule could also make it difficult for some corporations to meet the quorum
requirements. See id. at 12.
73

Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at SEC Open Meeting (July 1,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch070109mls.htm.
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Id.
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See 2009 Proxy Access Proposal, supra note 15, at 7.
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THE MORE THINGS CHANGE
A.

Proxy Access

An analysis of existing Delaware law reveals that the new amendments do
relatively little to directly alter the substantive rights of directors and shareholders.
Section 109 of the Delaware Code enables both stockholders and the board to
amend or repeal the corporation’s bylaws.76 Section 109 further provides that a
bylaw may address any issue relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct
of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders,
directors, officers, or employees.77 This broad provision seems to permit boards to
adopt the type of proxy access provision addressed under the new section 112.78
Section 109 certainly does not appear to prohibit proxy access bylaws.79 Moreover,
in 2008, the Delaware Supreme Court seemed to make clear that shareholder
sponsored bylaws aimed at encouraging “candidates other than board-sponsored
nominees for election” were valid under Delaware state law.80 The Delaware
legislature’s synopsis of section 112 notes that it “clarifies” the corporation’s ability
to enable stockholder nominees to be included in a proxy solicitation.81 Similarly, the
Corporate Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association indicated that the new
law emerged from the group’s effort to “clarify further the validity and flexibility of
bylaws establishing . . . proxy access.”82 Referring to the new section as a
“clarification” acknowledges that the law does not expand the rights previously
afforded to directors or shareholders. Moreover, while such a clarification may be
helpful by providing guidance with respect to the content of a proxy access bylaw,
the clarification was unnecessary to secure the right under state law to adopt such a
bylaw provision. In this regard, section 112 appears to confer a power that already
exists.
Perhaps more importantly for shareholders, the new law does not remove
the impediments at the federal level that prevent shareholders of public corporations
from proposing proxy access bylaws on the corporation’s proxy statement, and
therefore the new law does not really empower shareholders to craft proxy access
bylaws. Of course, at first glance, section 112 appears to permit shareholders to
76

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (Supp. 2009).
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Id.
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See Delaware Amendments, supra note 9.
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See tit. 8, § 109.

80

See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employee Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 236-37 (Del. 2008).

81

See Delaware Amendments, supra note 9, at 5.

82

See Delaware State Bar Comment Letter, supra note 57, at 4.

102

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 11

fashion and adopt proxy access bylaws.83 This is because section 109 specifically
enables shareholders to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws.84 Read together, sections
109 and 112 appear to permit shareholders to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaw
provisions related to proxy access.85 Unfortunately, current federal law specifically
prohibits shareholders from proposing bylaws on the corporation’s proxy statement
that relate to a nomination or election for membership to the board or that relate to
procedures for such nomination or election.86 In this regard, despite Delaware’s
recent actions, shareholders may not propose proxy access bylaws unless federal law
changes to permit such proposals. It could be that Delaware was seeking to
anticipate the SEC’s eventual adoption of a proxy access proposal, and thereby
ensure that there were no state law impediments to the proposal. This is certainly a
worthy endeavor in terms of enhancing shareholder power, but it is unnecessary in
light of section 109. Ultimately, unless and until federal law changes, the Delaware
law fails to grant any new rights to shareholders at all, and instead maintains the
status quo pursuant to which only directors have the authority to recommend
adoption of proxy access proposals.
It is possible that the new Delaware amendments could have an indirect
impact. With respect to directors, perhaps it will encourage boards to adopt proxy
access bylaw provisions. The Corporate Law Section of the Delaware State Bar
Association noted that the new law reflects Delaware’s view that a proxy access
system may prove beneficial for the corporations that adopt it.87 Along these lines,
perhaps directors either needed the added clarification provided by the new law or,
alternatively, needed the seeming sanction or tacit approval that the law seems to
confer in order to spur their adoption of an access provision.88 It is possible,
therefore, that the new law, though redundant, could encourage directors to adopt
proxy access proposals.
Of course, there is considerable reason to be skeptical about this possibility.
Although the law just went into effect, no corporation has expressed a desire to
adopt a proxy access proposal in its wake. Moreover, history suggests that such a
grant will have no appreciable impact on expanding shareholders’ access to the
corporate proxy statement. Indeed, there are almost no examples of corporations
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See Delaware Amendments, supra note 9.

84

See tit. 8, § 109.

85

See id.; see also Delaware Amendments, supra note 9.
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See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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See Delaware State Bar Comment Letter, supra note 57, at 2.

88

See id. at 2-3.
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that have voluntarily adopted proxy access bylaw provisions.89 Instead, corporations
tend to vigorously oppose such provisions.90 As one group of law firms commented:
Corporations already have the ability to voluntarily adopt measures
like those set out in the Proposal. Not only have corporations
generally refused to do so (with very few exceptions), but entrenched
corporate interests have fiercely opposed the implementation of any
proxy access rule, voluntary or otherwise, for over twenty years. A
rule that public corporations could choose to ignore would thus be
no rule at all.91
These observations suggest that the new law is unlikely to have a direct or
indirect impact on directors’ propensity to embrace proxy access, leaving the
landscape on this issue virtually unchanged.
For shareholders, Delaware’s actions may have an indirect, but significant,
effect on federal law, thereby finally granting shareholders the ability to introduce
proxy access proposals on the corporation’s proxy statement. Indeed, it is possible
that Delaware’s actions may have been designed to, or at least may in effect,
emphasize the importance of removing the federal impediments to proxy access
proposals. Accordingly, the Delaware law may serve an important signaling
function, indicating to the federal government Delaware’s willingness to look
favorably on shareholder-submitted proxy access proposals, and hence Delaware’s
willingness to look favorably on a federal law that sanctions such proposals. The
Delaware law may also serve an important signaling function for the business
community. The fact that so many different organizations and individuals expressed
their support for a rule that would allow shareholders to submit access proposals,
and relied upon Delaware’s actions to provide validity for their support, suggests that
Delaware’s actions have already encouraged many members of the business
community to embrace at least some aspect of proxy reform. In other words,
Delaware may have made such reform palatable to members of the business
community. By decreasing opposition to some aspect of proxy reform, Delaware
may have increased the likelihood that the SEC will adopt such reform.

89 However, after noting that very few examples exist of proxy access bylaw provisions, one law firm
commentary managed to identify two companies with such provisions: Apria Healthcare Group, Inc.
and RiskMetrics Group, Inc. See Latham & Watkins LLP & Georgeson Inc., Corporate Governance
Commentary, Proxy Access Analysis No. 2 (June 22, 2009), http://www.lw.com (search “Proxy Access
Analysis No. 2).
90

See Fairfax, supra note 1, at 1275-76 (describing litigation attempting to exclude various proxy access
proposals).
91

See Comment Letter of Securities and Governance Firms, supra note 47, at 3.
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Ultimately, if Delaware’s actions encourage the SEC to adopt Rule 14a-8(i)(8)
and thus eliminate the restriction on shareholder submission of proxy access
proposals, it could have a tremendous impact for shareholders and their ability to
gain access to the proxy statement. Indeed, many of the changes in shareholder
voting rights, from the increases in majority voting to the decrease in classified
boards, have resulted from shareholders’ use of the proposal process pursuant to
which certain institutional and retail investors submitted proposals on a given issue
and waged coordinated campaigns to encourage shareholder support.92 These
campaigns not only resulted in significant shareholder support, but also prompted
both corporations and legislatures to alter the governance standards.93 Notably, such
changes occurred despite the non-binding nature of many shareholder proposals,
suggesting that shareholder activism through the use of the proposal process has a
significant impact on corporate decision-making. Currently, federal impediments
undermine this activism with respect to proxy access by preventing shareholders
from proposing proxy access changes. But shareholders’ recent victories with
respect to other issues suggest that if shareholders obtain the right to include access
proposals on the corporation’s proxy statement, they may be able to transform that
right into the implementation of proxy access rules at targeted companies. If the
new Delaware amendments influence the SEC’s behavior, Delaware’s actions could
have a powerful, albeit indirect, impact on changing the landscape with respect to
proxy access.
One note of caution for shareholders, however, is that even if the SEC
amends Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to permit shareholder proxy access proposals, Delaware’s
preemptive strike may have implications for shareholders’ ability to influence the
type of proposal actually adopted. This is because unless and until such a federal
amendment takes effect, only directors can submit proxy access proposals; hence
they have a window of opportunity to submit proposals aimed at countering the
shareholder-friendly proposals that can be expected from advocate groups.
Directors may then be able to exclude any shareholder proposals on the same issue.94
Therefore, Delaware may have inadvertently given directors an advantage over
shareholders by enabling boards to control how proxy access is structured.

92

See Fairfax, supra note 1, 1288-93, 1303-04 (discussing proposal campaigns related to majority voting
and board declassification).
93

See id.

94 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(11) (allowing corporations to exclude proposals that involve
substantially the same issue).
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Proxy Reimbursement

The proxy reimbursement provision also could be viewed as conferring a
right that already existed under Delaware law. Indeed, the broad authority under
section 109 appears to permit directors and shareholders to amend or adopt bylaws
that provide for expense reimbursement.95 To be sure, there may have been a need
for additional clarification in this area. On the one hand, the 2008 Delaware
Supreme Court decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan found that a
shareholder-proposed bylaw requiring proxy reimbursement was valid under state
law.96 On the other hand, that decision found that such a bylaw was invalid under
Delaware law because it might require directors to violate their fiduciary duty.97
While the decision seemed to leave open the possibility that such a bylaw would be
valid if properly constructed, the legislation could be viewed as necessary clarification
on the issue. In fact, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded its opinion by
indicating that shareholder activists should seek recourse from the Delaware
legislature to ensure the validity of broad proxy reimbursement bylaws.98 In this
regard, this new legislation could have more impact on the status quo, at least with
regard to state law.
By contrast, the federal law question seems to be well-settled. Unlike proxy
access, federal rules do not prevent shareholders from submitting proposals on this
issue. Instead, in 2007, the SEC made clear that a shareholder bylaw provision that
relates to the reimbursement of proxy expenses in contested elections may not be
excluded under the general exclusion for director elections and procedures.99 Since
such access provisions were permitted under both state and federal law, section 113
does not extend a new right to directors or shareholders, and thus does not
meaningfully alter the status quo.
Importantly, while a proxy reimbursement regime may facilitate shareholders’
exercise of their voting right, it does not substitute for direct proxy access. This is
because proxy access enables shareholders to avoid the expense associated with
preparing and distributing a proxy statement altogether. By contrast, an expense
reimbursement provision requires shareholders to incur such expense, albeit with the
95

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §109 (Supp. 2009).

96

953 A.2d 227, 237.
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See id. at 238.

98 See id. at 240 (“Those who believe that CA’s shareholders should be permitted to make the
proposed Bylaw [i.e. without a fiduciary out] as drafted part of CA’s governance scheme, have two
alternatives. They may seek to amend the Certificate of Incorporation to include the substance of the
Bylaw; or they may seek recourse from the Delaware General Assembly.”) (emphasis in original).
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See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, supra note 52, at 70,454 n. 56.
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promise of reimbursement under certain circumstances. To the extent shareholders
do not have the up-front resources to wage a proxy contest, a reimbursement regime
does not necessarily ameliorate the hurdles posed by the costs of waging a proxy
battle. As a result, it is an inferior substitute for proxy access. This is underscored
by the fact that, despite the ability to introduce bylaws on this issue, shareholders
continue to advocate strongly for proxy access. Then too, regardless of the merits or
efficacy of a reimbursement right, it is a right that already existed under Delaware
law.
Taken together, this section reveals that, while the new Delaware
amendments may have clarified and better defined the scope of proxy access and
expense reimbursement rights, they did not actually confer any new rights on
shareholders or directors. In terms of proxy reimbursement, at best this means that
the new amendments simply reaffirm the ability to propose bylaws on this issue. In
terms of proxy access, this means that the Delaware law did not, and could not, grant
shareholders the right to propose access bylaw changes on the corporation’s proxy
statement. Instead, only the SEC has the power to grant such a right by removing
impediments to the proxy proposal regime. On this point, there is some reason to
believe that Delaware’s actions may encourage the SEC to remove those
impediments. If that occurs, then Delaware’s new amendments will have played a
major role in enhancing shareholder power.
III.

DELAWARE AND FEDERAL INTERVENTION

Recently several scholars have begun to recognize the important interaction
between the federal government and Delaware on issues of corporate governance.100
Such scholars note that instead of competition from other states, competition from
the federal government represents the primary check on Delaware’s behavior in the
realm of corporate law.101 While not necessarily a persistent check, Delaware
nevertheless shapes its laws with the background understanding that its failure to
protect sufficiently the interests of shareholders and the corporation could trigger
federal intervention.102 Arguably, the threat is augmented during times of turmoil
involving corporations when concerns are raised regarding managerial accountability,
the adequacy of directors’ adherence to their fiduciary responsibilities, and safeguards
against fraud or abuses of authority. Hence, Delaware becomes more cognizant of
that threat and the need to protect its role in the corporate governance arena.
In this context, it should come as no surprise that the current recession and
financial meltdown, the biggest since the Great Depression, would prompt federal
100

See supra note 18.
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See id.

102

See id.
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intervention and a resulting response from Delaware. Indeed, in addition to crafting
the proposal eventually passed by the Delaware legislature, the Corporate Law
Section of the Delaware State Bar Association submitted a formal written comment
to the SEC’s federal proxy access proposal.103 The submission marked the first time
in history that the Delaware State Bar Association, or any of its member groups,
provided official comments to the SEC.104 The group made the decision to submit
comments because the SEC’s proposal “significantly implicates . . . ‘the traditional
role of the states in regulating corporate governance.’”105 The comment letter noted
that a federal proxy access rule would steer disputes towards the federal court system
and away from the courts of the corporation’s state of incorporation, primarily
Delaware.106 It further stated that the Delaware courts had a “well-earned reputation
for prompt, sophisticated and efficient resolution of specialized corporate law
disputes.”107 The letter concluded by noting that Delaware state courts are “far more
capable” than federal courts in resolving disputes.108 In this regard, the letter
pinpointed the jurisdictional issue that animates Delaware’s response.
But will that response prove successful in ensuring that Delaware maintains
its position of prominence by forestalling federal intrusion into the corporate
governance arena? On the one hand, Delaware’s actions did not prevent the SEC
from proposing new rules covering the exact same ground as those covered by
Delaware. Indeed, despite the fact that Delaware managed to pass legislation prior
to any SEC action, the SEC nevertheless proceeded with a proposal of its own.
Although the SEC acknowledged Delaware’s actions in this area, Commissioner
Schapiro noted that the SEC would view the issue with “fresh eyes.”109 Hence,
Delaware’s actions appear to have had no impact on the SEC’s decision to move
forward with a proxy access proposal. Moreover, those actions did not seem to
minimize the breadth of that proposal. The SEC’s proposal sweeps far more broadly
than Delaware’s amendments, even preempting Delaware law regarding proxy access
with respect to public companies. Prior to issuing its proposed rule, the SEC
Commissioner acknowledged the Delaware changes related to proxy access and
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See Delaware State Bar Comment Letter, supra note 57.
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Id. at 2.
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noted that the SEC would consider those changes in fashioning their proposal.110
Such consideration did not appear to translate into any curtailment of the SEC’s
intrusion in the proxy access arena. The fact that Delaware’s actions neither
prevented the new federal proposal, nor compelled the SEC to limit the reach of that
proposal, does not appear to bode well for Delaware.
On the other hand, the SEC’s express acknowledgement of Delaware’s
actions seems to confirm the state’s importance and continued relevance. Indeed,
not only did the SEC Chair specifically note the intention of considering Delaware’s
actions when shaping the SEC’s proxy access proposal, but Delaware was the only
state to which the SEC afforded such deference.111 The very acknowledgement of
the need to consider Delaware’s actions highlights its preeminent status.
In addition, Delaware’s actions may be sufficient to halt or at least delay
enactment of a federally-mandated proxy access rule. Many comment letters insisted
that a federal proxy access rule was inappropriate precisely because it failed to
recognize and give proper weight to changes at the state level, particularly those
implemented by Delaware.112 Commentators insisted that regulators should assess
the impact of those changes before intruding into state law.113 In this respect,
Delaware’s amendments provided necessary fodder for commentators, potentially
validating arguments against additional federal intervention. If the SEC chooses to
reject federally-mandated proxy access, it is likely that Delaware’s actions will have
played a significant role in that choice. It is also possible that Delaware’s actions
enabled the SEC to feel more comfortable in its recent delay.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A careful analysis of the new Delaware amendments reveals that such
amendments purport to confer rights that already existed under Delaware state law,
undermining the extent to which such amendments can be viewed as having any
impact on the proxy access or proxy reimbursement landscape. However, those
amendments may play an indirect role in encouraging the business community to
110

See id. (noting that in considering a proposal for proxy access, the SEC would consider its previous
efforts on this issue, as well as the “potential impact of proposed changes to Delaware’s corporate
law.”).
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See Federal Securities Regulation Comment Letter, supra note 24, at 7-8; Comment Letter of Corporate
Secretaries, supra note 57, at 2; see also Comment Letter of California Bar Corporations Committee, supra note 57,
at 6 (noting that the proposed system would have a negative impact on the current corporate
governance regime under state law).
113 See Federal Securities Regulation Comment Letter, supra note 24, at 7-8; Comment Letter of Corporate
Secretaries, supra note 57, at 2; see also Comment Letter of California Bar Corporations Committee, supra note 57,
at 6.
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embrace a more limited version of proxy access, and thus facilitating the SEC’s
adoption of such a version. While such a resolution may fall short of the kind of
universal proxy access that some advocates may have desired, it certainly advances
the campaign for access in important ways. The amendments may also serve the
more subtle purpose of reinforcing Delaware’s status as the preeminent body for
regulating corporate affairs. On this point, there is reason to believe that the
amendments either will serve to prevent the adoption of a federal proxy access rule
or will lead to a significant curtailment of the nature of any rule eventually adopted.
While this may prove disconcerting for shareholder advocates, it supports the
budding thesis among several corporate scholars regarding the importance of the
interplay between federal law and Delaware law, whereby one serves to balance and
check the other.

